Measurement Device Independent Quantum Private Query (MDI QPQ) with qutrits is presented. We identified that this variant of QPQ protocol resists the optimization of both database security and client's privacy simultaneously. We compare the database security and client's privacy in MDI QPQ for qubits with qutrits. For some instances, we observe that qutrit will provide better security for database than qubit. However, when it comes to the question of client's privacy qubit will provide better security than qutrit. Hence we conclude that though in case of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) higher dimension provides better security but in case of QPQ this is not obvious.
I. INTRODUCTION
The very first protocol of quantum cryptography was Bennett and Brassard's BB84 [1] key distribution protocol. In these thirty years, the field is progressing gradually. For the first two decades, the main focus of quantum cryptography was to establish a secret key between two distant parties. But for the last one decade several other quantum cryptographic primitives are proposed. Quantum Private Query(QPQ) is one of them.
Let us consider the situation where Bob is a database provider and Alice is a user. Now Alice wants to know a certain element from that database without providing any information about her query to Bob. On the other hand, Bob tries to resist Alice to know any other elements from the database except her query. The first one is called user or client's privacy whereas the second one is known as database security. This problem is a variant of Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR). In [2] it has been shown that a prefect quantum SPIR protocol is impossible. However, Giovannetti et al. [3] came out with a variant of this and called it Quantum Private Query. Some relaxations in the security notions had made it feasible in quantum paradigm.
The protocol suggested by Giovannetti et al. was purely theoretical. Jacobi et al. [4] for the first time proposed a practical QPQ protocol based on SARG04 [5] QKD protocol. Using SARG04 QKD protocol, an asymmetric key which is used to encrypt the whole database, is distributed between Bob and Alice. According to the protocol, 1 4 portion of the key is known to Alice. Gao et al. [6] proposed a flexible QPQ protocol (formally known as GLWC protocol) by generalizing Jacobi's protocol. The difference is that in GLWC protocol Alice knows , GLWC protocol provides better database security but there is a high probability to guess the address of Alice's query. To solve this issue, Yang et al. [7] proposed an entanglement based QPQ protocol based on B92 [8] QKD Protocol.
Very recently, Zhao et al. [9] has developed a detectorblinding attack by dishonest Bob on Jacobi and GLWC protocol and shown that how detector's side channel attack breaks the user privacy completely. To remove all such type of side channel attacks, they then proposed a Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QPQ protocol exploiting MDI QKD in [10, 11] .
In MDI QKD, Alice and Bob send their encoded photons to an untrusted third party (UTP) Charlie who performs the Bell state measurement (BSM) and announces the measurement result to Alice and Bob. Depending on Charlie's announcement, Alice and Bob can find a correlation between their photons and thus can establish a secret key between themselves. In MDI QPQ [9] , this idea has been exploited to establish an asymmetric key between Bob and Alice. Database privacy remains same as previous QPQ protocols [6, 7] . They proved the loss tolerance user privacy under some specific attack models.
Recently, Jo and Son [12] have proposed a MDI QKD protocol using qutrits. It is expected that a higher dimensional state can carry more information per quanta than a qubit. And hence they have noticed an enhancement in key rate compared to qubit MDI QKD.
Motivated by this, we try to understand if it is indeed the case for all cryptographic primitives. In this direction, we explore MDI QPQ for qutrit. We observe that for some instances if we go for higher dimension, then it is possible to obtain better database security. However, in such cases we have to loose user privacy. That indicates that in case of qutrit we can not optimize both database security and user privacy simultaneously. The security issues are very much protocol specific. It disproved our conjecture that higher dimension always provides better security.
II. MEASUREMENT DEVICE INDEPENDENT QUANTUM PRIVATE QUERY USING QUTRITS
In case of qutrit the dimension of Hilbert space is three. The general form of a qutrit |ψ can be expressed as
where γ 1 , γ 2 are parameters such that 0 ≤ γ 1 , γ 2 ≤ π 2 . By applying a specific unitary transformation on the computational basis vectors {|0 , |1 , |2 }, one can get a set of orthonormal basis vectors which includes the state of (1) . Following are the examples of such basis states.
There are nine maximally entangled states of the three dimensional bipartite system. We define {|φ i } as the set of three-dimensional maximally entangled states, where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 8}, and each state is described as
where k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2} and ω = e 2πi 3 . We omit (mod 3) from all indices for simplification. Then the threedimensional Bell state measurement (3d-BSM) is defined as a set of projections {P i = |φ i φ i |}.
In MDI QPQ, Charlie performs the Bell State Measurement (BSM) with the photons coming from Bob and Alice in the motivation towards establishing an asymmetric key between Alice and Bob. Charlie may play the role of an eavesdropper.
However, the QPQ protocol is viewed as a mistrustful cryptographic primitive. Hence, we need not to consider an outsider (Charlie) as an eavesdropper. Either Bob or Alice may behave as an adversary. We will analyze the security issues in this initiative.
Protocol:
1. Bob sends, uniformly at random, one of the six polarized states |0 , |1 , |2 , |0 , |1 , |2 to Charlie, where γ 1 , γ 2 ∈ (0, π 2 ). The rectilinear basis {|0 , |1 , |2 } encodes to key bit 0 and the basis{|0 , |1 , |2 } encodes to the key bit 1.
2. Alice sends, uniformly at random, one of the six polarized states |0 , |1 , |2 , |0 , |1 , |2 to Charlie. The parameters γ 1 , γ 2 are same as Bob. They should have prior discussion about this.
3. Charlie performs the BSM and declares the results publicly. Alice records the measurement result. In fact, she needs to identify only the Bell state |φ 0 . Theoretical probabilities for obtaining |φ 0 for different combinations are shown in the Table I. 4. For each trial Charlie obtained a Bell state |φ 0 , Bob announces a trit 0 to Alice if he has sent |0 or |0 , 1 if he has sent |1 or |1 and 2 if he has sent|2 or |2 .
5. Depending on the state Alice has sent to Charlie and the declaration of Bob she will try to guess the key bit.
6. After the key establishment Alice and Bob go for error correction to check the noise in the channel.
7. If Alice knows the jth bit of the key K and wants to know the ith element of the database, she declares the integer s = j − i. Bob shifts K by s and hence gets a new key, say K 0 .
8. Bob encrypts his database by this new key K 0 with one-time pad and sends the encrypted database to Alice. Alice decrypts the value with her jth key bit and gets the required element of the database.
We now discuss how Alice obtains a conclusive raw key bit.
1. If Bob has sent the state |0 and announced the trit 0, according to 
III. COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY ISSUES FOR QUTRIT WITH QUBIT
In this section we compare the security issues of MDI QPQ protocol for qutrit with qubit assuming one of the parties is dishonest.
A. Database Security
In case of database security we assume that Alice is dishonest. Her goal is to exact more element from the database except her query. This will be possible if she can increase her success probability to guess a key bit than what is suggested by the protocol. In this sub-section we will see how we can reduce the success probability of Alice and hence can enhance the database security exploiting qutrit.
From Table II we now calculate the success probability of Alice to guess a raw key bit of Bob. Let A be a random variable that Alice has guessed about B (random variable possessed by Bob). Thus the probability of success can be written as Where the event C = |φ 0 implies Charlie measures |φ 0 . A and B represent the states sent by Alice and Bob respectively.
From Table II , it is clear that, Pr(A = 0|B = 0) = Pr(A = 1|B = 1) because of symmetry and thus, p(γ1, γ2) = Pr(A = B) Figure 1 shows the change in the database privacy with the change of γ 1 and γ 2 . In case of MDI QPQ with qubits [9] , the success probability of Alice to obtain a conclusive raw key is p (θ) = sin 2 θ 2 , where the parameter θ ∈ (0, π 2 ) is chosen by Bob. Note that in case of qutrit the success probability of Alice contains two parameters γ 1 , γ 2 . However, in case of qubit it contains only one parameter θ. So, we cannot compare our result with [9] in general. To show which one gives better database privacy we have to keep at least one of the parameters for qutrit fixed and compare another with θ.
Let us define,
We can see that, in the region R 1 , p(γ 1 , γ 2 ) < p (γ 1 ) and in the region R 2 , p(γ 1 , γ 2 ) < p (γ 2 ). That means in these two regions Alice's success probability reduces if we consider qutrit. As the database is encrypted by the key possessed by Bob, thus if we can reduce the success probability of Alice to guess a key bit of Bob, we can increase the security of the database. The MDI QPQ protocol using qutrits with parameters (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∈ R 1 gives better database security than the MDI QPQ protocol using qubits with the parameter θ = γ 1 . Similarly the MDI QPQ protocol with qutrit and with (γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∈ R 2 gives better database security than the MDI QPQ protocol with qubits and with θ = γ 2 . Figure 2 shows the region for R 1 and R 2 with red and blue shades respectively. In other words, for the values of (γ 1 , γ 2 ) in the coloured region of the Figure 2 , 3d-MDI QPQ protocol gives better database security than 2d-MDI QPQ protocol performed with either γ 1 or γ 2 .
B. User Privacy
User privacy is analyzed against Middle State Attack introduced in [6] . In the Middle State Attack it is assumed that Bob is dishonest. He tries to guess the position of the key bit that Alice has obtained with certainty.
Now, we will revisit [9] to understand how the Middle State Attack for MDI QPQ with qubits has been defended. At first, we will consider the case when both Bob and Alice are honest.
At the beginning of the protocol, Bob and Alice send one of the four polarized photons |0 , |1 , |0 , |1 uniformly at random to the BSM possessed by Alice, where The rectilinear basis {|0 , |1 } is encoded to the key bit 0 and the basis {|0 , |1 } is encoded to the key bit 1. For each measurement output
Bob will declare a key bit 0 if he has sent |0 or |0 and 1 for |1 or |1 . Probability of obtaining |ψ − for different possibilities are shown in the Based on the declaration of Bob and the qubit Alice has sent, Alice can guess Bob's qubit with certainty. For example, suppose Bob has sent |0 and declared 0, then from Table III it can be seen that Alice guesses Bob's qubit only when she has sent |0 . In this case she will conclude the key bit as 0. The probability that Alice can guess a conclusive raw key bit is
2 . For simplicity we consider that Alice and Bob choose the same θ. Another variant of the protocol is discussed in [9] where one of them uses θ and other one uses (θ+ π 2 ). The analysis is same for both the variants.
In case of Middle State Attack a dishonest Bob sends Let us consider the instance when Bob has sent |0 and declares 1. In this case Alice will conclude her key bit as 0 if she has sent |1 and 1 if she has sent |1 . Now, the probability to guess a key bit as 0 by Alice is
and the probability to guess a key bit as 1 by Alice is
Let E be the event that Alice concludes the raw key bit with certainty. Hence, the total probability to get a conclusive raw key bit by Alice is The motivation of Bob to increase the success probability of Alice is to track the positions where there is a higher probability to get a conclusive key bits. However, he can not decide if it is 0 or 1 as the success probability of Alice to get the key bit as 0 and as 1 is same. In this case he has to insert the key bits randomly. And this will introduce an error in the channel. When Alice and Bob perform error correction this error is identified. Alice will identify this error as quantum bit error rate (QBER). In this case, QBER is equal to 1 2 . Noticing this Alice will abort the Protocol.
In case of qutrit, Bob will send one of the following states uniformly at random to Charlie and announces 1, 2, 0 respectively to Alice.
Theoretical probabilities (after normalization) for obtaining the Bell state |φ 0 in this case are shown in the Table  V. Let us now consider the instance when Bob sends |0 to Charlie and declare the trit 1. As Alice is honest, Alice will conclude her raw key bit as 0 if she has sent |0 or |2 and 1 if she has sent |0 or |2 . Similar thing happens for other cases also.
Let E be the event that Alice concludes the raw key bit with certainty. Then the total probability of obtaining a Figure 4 shows the comparison in the probability of obtaining a raw key bit by Alice when Bob performs the protocol honestly with the probability of obtaining a raw key bit by Alice when Bob performs the protocol dishonestly. Black surface shows the variation in probability with respect to γ 1 and γ 2 for honest Bob and the yellow surface shows the same when Bob sends middle states. It is clear from the figure that, the probability to get a key bit by Alice is very high in case of middle state than the honest performance of the protocol. Now, let us consider the example when Bob sends |0 and declares 1. In this case Alice will conclude the key bit as 0. The probability to get conclusive raw key bit as Similarly, the probability to get conclusive raw key bit as 1 is 2 )
As p 0 < p 1 , with a very high probability Alice will conclude the key bit as 1. Bob also encodes this event with the key bit 1. And hence, the key bit of Alice and the key bit of Bob match. In error correction phase such Middle State Attack is hardly identified. Now with this Middle State Attack Bob can guess the position j of Alice's key bit with a very high probability. When Alice sends s = j − i, Bob will immediately come to know the position i of the the database element as i = j − s.
For the other two declarations, i.e., for 2 and 0, the same thing happens.
The attack can be defended only when, p 0 = p 1 i.e., when γ 2 = 0. In that case, the middle states becomes
This case is similar to MDI QPQ with qubits [9] .
IV. A SPACIAL CASE
In this section we will discuss MDI QPQ protocol for Fourier basis. The Fourier Basis states are as follows.
where ω = e . The set {|0 , |1 , |2 } form an orthonormal basis and is related to the computational basis by Discrete Fourier Transform. Now the 3d-MDI QPQ protocol will be performed with this new set of basis. For the earlier case, Alice and Bob have to consider the cases where the measurement output was |φ 0 , whereas for this case they can choose any of the nine Bell states. Theoretical probabilities for obtaining |φ 0 for different combinations are shown in the Table VI. In case of qubits the success probability of Alice to get a conclusive key bit in Fourier basis is 1 4 [4] . Contrary to this, here it becomes 1 3 . Thus, in this case we will not obtain better database security. And hence, we do not bother about the Middle State Attack.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been identified that in Quantum Key Distribution higher dimension provides better security. In [12] the enhancement in the key rate of MDI QKD has been achieved exploiting qutrit. Motivated by this we try to understand whether this is the case for general cryptographic primitives.
In this direction, we explore MDI QPQ with qutrit. Our analysis shows a counter intuitive result. We observe that though database security can be enhanced using qutrit, the client's privacy becomes vulnerable. We can not optimize both the database and client security in three dimension simultaneously. Hence, we conclude that higher dimension is not always advantageous in case of cryptographic primitives. It varies from protocol to protocol.
In the present draft we explore three dimension only. Analysis of the security issues for MDI QPQ for any dimension greater that 3d would be an interesting future research problem.
